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The trade in cultural products remains one of the most persistentpoints of contention between China and its trading partners. Sincethe beginning of the ‘90s, continuing high rates of media piracy, the
relatively low import quota for motion pictures and the various barriers
erected against foreign participation in the media market have brought the
Hollywood lobby to press for trade pressure against China. This led to three
episodes in which the United States Trade Representative (USTR) threatened
to sanction China for its alleged failure to protect US intellectual property
rights. Trade wars were only narrowly averted each time, after protracted
negotiation. As a result, China swiftly instituted comprehensive intellectual
property legislation and enforcement mechanisms. (1)
It also provided an extra stimulant for China to gain WTO membership.
While China had started accession procedures to GATT in 1986 already, the
post- Tiananmen environment had lent extra urgency to this issue. After
1989, the leftist wing of the Party had retrenched its ideological and eco-
nomic position, until Deng Xiaoping used his “southern tour ( nanxun南巡 )
to continue the market-based reform process. As the Party would hence-
forth base its legitimacy on economic performance, WTO accession was a
means to ensure that China – through its export-based growth model,
would become so reliant on the market economy and foreign trade, that it
would become impossible to turn the reforms back. (2) In China’s interna-
tional politics, joining the GATT (and later, the WTO) also had another big
boon. Its multilateral nature, and the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism
would protect China from having to go through arduous bilateral trade ne-
gotiations on a regular basis, and from a non-renewal of its Most-Favoured
Nation status by the US Congress.
At the same time, the post-Tiananmen environment that stimulated ex-
ternal trade, had also demonstrated to the leadership that control over pub-
lic communication – which had lessened during the Eighties – had to be
reasserted in order to prevent further organized dissent. (3) Furthermore, the
leadership had been severely shocked by the abrupt end of Communism in
Eastern Europe, which it largely ascribed to Western “peaceful evolution”
efforts. (4) Hence, in the area of audio-visual media, the priority remained to
keep foreign influence to a minimum. Concern about the ability of the Chi-
nese cultural sector to withstand a foreseen onslaught by Hollywood further
strengthened this resolve. (5) This is reflected in China’s services commit-
ments: while the import quota for foreign films were raised to 20 per year,
foreign media enterprises would be limited to minority participation in joint
ventures, in certain designated areas which were less sensitive, or where the
leadership wished to acquire foreign know-how and technology. The result-
ing situation – persistent high rates of piracy and low returns from the in-
creasingly enticing Chinese market – frustrated Hollywood, and illustrated
the conflict between the fundamentally differing vision of cultural products
between the US and China. Where Hollywood’s ambitions are mainly com-
mercial, requiring an open market, China sees media products as important
political tools, requiring control.
This frustration led to the USTR filing two requests for consultations in
2007. DS362, China – Intellectual Property Rights and DS363, China –
Audio-visual Products and Services. These respectively called into question
denial of copyright to unauthorized products and criminal enforcement
thresholds, and a number of import and distribution barriers discriminating
against non-Chinese media enterprises. As such, they are not “typical” trade
cases, neither in terms of product covered (films, television programmes
and music), nor – to a certain extent – in terms of the specific measures
addressed. They are at the nexus of interrelated aspects of international and
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domestic politics, both in the United States and China, involve complex
questions which, according to some observers, are on or even over the edge
of what the WTO should concern itself with, (6) and illustrate the potential
conflict between a trade order established on liberal economic principles
and Chinese authoritarianism. (7)
This essay aims to provide a better understanding of how this tension is
perceived in the Chinese media and what this can tell us about the future
developments of the Chinese media regime. This article is structured in the
following way. First, I will provide a brief overview of both cases concerned.
Second, I will analyze the official discourse concerning these cases, paying
particular attention to where both parties in the dispute lay the emphasis,
and contextualizing these in the broader framework of Sino-US relations.
Third, I will outline how these cases are presented in the Chinese media;
what the expected and preferred outcomes are, and which position this
takes in the broader picture of Chinese media policy, in order to shed more
light on how this discourse may function in agenda-setting, policymaking
and change.
The cases
Since the late Eighties, piracy and counterfeiting had been a bone of con-
tention between China and other trade partners, particularly the United
States. Since then, China created a comprehensive legislative framework
that largely complied with international standards, and after 2001, with
China’s WTO commitments. Also, significant resources were dedicated to
anti-piracy and counterfeiting enforcement efforts. In fact, few countries in
the world spend more per capita on IPR enforcement than China. (8) How-
ever, counterfeiting and piracy remained rampant, particularly in the media
and software sector. (9) Apart from piracy, Hollywood was also increasingly
irritated by the barriers erected against foreign presence in the Chinese
media market, exemplified by the screening quota for foreign cinema
films, (10) but which also entail restrictions on market access for products
and operators, investment restrictions, censorship and content review pro-
cedures, etc. (11) In 2007, the USTR took the decision to file a request for
consultations – the first step on the road to a WTO dispute – in two cases,
DS362, concerning copyright law and enforcement standards and DS363,
concerning market access for media products and operators.
There were two main US claims in DS362. First, it was claimed that Article
4 of the 2001 Chinese Copyright Law - which stated that works of which
publication was prohibited, would not be protected by copyright law – vi-
olated the prohibition of formalities for copyright grant present in the Berne
Convention, incorporated into WTO law by Article 9(1) TRIPS (Trade-related
aspects of intellectual property rights). Second, quantitative thresholds for
criminal copyright prosecution were alleged to exceed the standard in Ar-
ticle 61 TRIPS that criminal punishment must be available “at least in cases
of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial
scale.” (12) A third, less important claim, concerned measures to dispose of
counterfeiting products after removal of the counterfeited trademark.
In this case, both sides scored a number of points. The Panel ruled that
the wording of Article 4, as well as the counterfeiting disposal rules, violated
WTO rules. It also found that the US had not brought sufficient evidence
to prove the empirical point that the minimum criminal enforcement stan-
dards against copyright piracy indeed exceeded the definition of “commer-
cial scale.” The Panel Report was not appealed, and the findings of the Panel
were quickly implemented. (13) This was possible because updating the in-
consistent rules was relatively easy. In the case of the Copyright Law, Article
4 was updated to state that rights holders are required to exercise their
copyright in accordance with the law, and that the State institutes a cen-
sorship regime.
In comparison, DS363 was a much larger case. It concerned a plethora of
Chinese measures that were aimed to prevent foreign works and foreign
actors from accessing the Chinese market. They were grouped under four
major headings: trading rights under the Accession Protocol, market access
commitments under Article XVI GATS, national treatment under Article XVII
GATS and national treatment under Article III:4 GATT. (14) The claims con-
cerned a variety of product areas, including cinema films, audio-visual prod-
ucts, publications and on-line music, and addressed issues related to barriers
on company establishment, investment, import and distribution. In other
words, DS363 struck at the heart of the Chinese foreign media control
regime. (15) China’s defence was partly built on procedural grounds, and it
successfully managed to exploit a number of procedural errors by the US.
It also invoked on cultural exception as present in Article XX(a) GATT 1994.
The US furthermore did not sufficiently argue a number of claims, leading
to these not being considered by the Panel. (16) Apart from these, the US
won across the board, as the Panel found that the measures at issue violated
China’s accession commitments and general WTO discipline.
In contrast to the IP case, DS363 was appealed by both China and the US.
China argued that trading rights commitments do not apply to cinema films
and unfinished audio-visual products, that it could invoke the cultural ex-
ception in Article XX(a) GATT 1994 in a claim concerning the AP, and it dis-
puted the scope of the GATS schedule entry on “sound recording
distribution services,” claiming that this did not include on-line distribution.
The US challenged the finding of the Panel that the requirement to conform
to State planning, as present in a number of Chinese regulations, is necessary
to protect public morals. The Appellate Body upheld most findings of the
Panel, with the exception of finding that the cultural exception can be
claimed with respect to the AP, and that the state plan requirement is not
necessary for the protection of public morals.
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Again in contrast with DS362, the findings of DS363 were never fully im-
plemented. Cosmetic updates were made to a number of regulations, (17)
which only cosmetically addressed the findings of the Panel, and did not
meaningfully address the issues underlying the US case. Rather, the US and
China came to an agreement.
The official discourse
A lot about the underlying attitudes towards the international trading sys-
tem can be deduced from the official discourse concerning the two cases
at issues. In dispute settlement, there are three major phases. The first is
the initiation of the dispute, which proceeds in two stages: a request for
consultations and a panel request. The second stage is the Panel stage, end-
ing in the publication of the Panel Report. In the majority of cases, the case
will then proceed to the Appellate Body. (18) The dispute can end at any stage,
and it is up to the complainant to decide to proceed to the consultation
and Panel stages, while the respondent may also appeal a Panel Report.
The official discourse concerning DS362 and DS363 can be situated in
these three stages. When the two requests for consultations were filed, the
US Trade Representative stated that:
Piracy and counterfeiting levels in China remain unacceptably high.
Inadequate protection of intellectual property rights in China costs
U.S. firms and workers billions of dollars each year, and in the case
of many products, it also poses a serious risk of harm to consumers
in China, the United States and around the world. We acknowledge
that China’s leadership has made the protection of intellectual
property rights a priority and has taken active steps to improve IPR
protection and enforcement. However, while the United States and
China have been able to work cooperatively and pragmatically on
a range of IPR issues, and China has taken numerous steps to im-
prove its protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights,
we have not been able to agree on several important changes to
China’s legal regime that we believe are required by China’s WTO
commitments. Because bilateral dialogue has not resolved our con-
cerns, we are taking the next step by requesting WTO consultations.
[…] In the same vein, we have discussed with China in detail the
harm to U.S. industries, authors and artists who produce books,
journals, movies, videos, and music caused by limiting the impor-
tation of these products to Chinese state-owned entities, and the
problems caused by Chinese laws that hobble the distribution of
foreign home entertainment products and publications within
China. These products are favorite targets for IPR pirates, and the
legal obstacles standing between these legitimate products and the
consumers in China give IPR pirates the upper hand in the Chinese
market. (19)
The Chinese response to this was regretful. The Ministry of Commerce is-
sued a statement claiming that:
The Chinese government’s attitude towards intellectual property
rights protection has always been resolute, and its achievements ob-
vious to all. […] This runs against the consensus reached between
the two countries’ leaders as to developing bilateral trade relations
and properly handling trade problems.
Furthermore, it said the action would “seriously damage the two countries’
established cooperation and bring an unfavourable impact on bilateral
trade.” (20)
Later, Chinese vice-premier Wu Yi stated that:
“The USTR, has totally ignored the massive strides China has made.
[The US action] flies in the face of the agreement between the two
country’s leaders to propose dialogue as a way of settling disputes.
[…] This will have an utterly negative impact and will inevitably badly
damage bilateral intellectual property cooperation,” she said, also
warning it would “harm” cooperation over market access issues. (21)
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The DS362 Panel Report was completed first, and its conclusions were re-
ceived relatively well by both sides. The United States stated that:
Today, a WTO panel found that a number of deficiencies in China’s
IPR regime are incompatible with its WTO obligations. These find-
ings are an important victory […] Having achieved this significant
legal ruling, we will engage vigorously with China on appropriate
corrective actions to ensure that U.S. rights holders obtain the ben-
efits of this decision […] The Panel did find, however, that it needed
more evidence in order to conclude that actual thresholds for pros-
ecution in China’s criminal law are so high as to allow commercial-
scale counterfeiting and piracy to occur without the possibility of
criminal prosecution. While this conclusion is disappointing, the
United States is encouraged that the Panel, facing a case of first
impression, set forth a market-based analytical approach that
should help WTO Members and panels avoid or resolve future dis-
putes concerning obstacles to criminal enforcement against coun-
terfeiting and piracy. (22)
The Chinese side also claimed victory. MOFCOM claimed a “the expert
group report rebutted the great majority of the US side’s claims and broadly
vindicated China’s intellectual property system.” (23) Furthermore, MOFCOM
maintained China’s right to censor publications. As DS362 was not appealed,
there was no further official communication concerning this case, save for
a notice by the USTR when the Dispute Settlement Body adopted the Panel
Report. This notice confirmed that the United States would use “all appro-
priate tools” to ensure that trading partners keep commitments, and that
the US would remain constructively engaged with China on IPR protec-
tion. (24)
DS363, being more complex and striking close at the heart of one of the
Chinese leadership’s core interests, aroused more discussion. As the Panel
Report was published, US Trade Representative Ron Kirk stated that:
Today, a WTO panel handed a significant victory to America’s creative
industries. […] These findings are an important step toward ensuring
market access for legitimate U.S. products in the Chinese market, as
well as ensuring market access for U.S. exporters and distributors of
those products. We will work tirelessly so that American companies
and workers can fully realize the market opening benefits that this
decision signals. […] This decision promises to level the playing field
for American companies working to distribute high- quality enter-
tainment products in China, so that legitimate American products
can get to market and beat out the pirates. To me, that is a clear win.
We believe that this report will help pave the way toward more open
trade between China and America. (25)
China, again, was less pleased with the outcome of the case, as Ministry
of Commerce spokesperson Yao Jian indicated that China “regretted” 
( yihan 遗憾 ) the outcome of the cases, and considered filing an appeal.
Yao further stated that:
China has always fulfilled its obligations on market access for publi-
cations, and the channels for foreign publications, films and audio-
visual products to enter the Chinese market are extremely open”
( shifen changtong十分畅通 ). (26)
As indicated higher, both sides appealed the case, in which the majority
of US claims were upheld. As a response to this, USTR Kirk stated that:
[…] America got a big win. […] The Appellate Body’s findings are key
to ensuring full market access in China for legitimate, high-quality en-
tertainment products and the exporters and distributors of those
products. U.S. companies and workers are at the cutting edge of these
industries, and they deserve a full chance to compete under agreed
WTO rules. We expect China to respond promptly to these findings
and bring its measures into compliance. […] This case is also an im-
portant part of our efforts to combat intellectual property piracy. The
panel and Appellate Body findings ensure that legitimate American
products are granted market access so that they can get to market
and beat out the pirates. This finding helps to ensure that America’s
creative ingenuity and innovation are protected abroad. (27)
The Chinese response was less positive. While it welcomed the clarification
on some of the restrictions made in the Panel Report, as well as the affir-
mation of the exemption clause cited by the Chinese side in this case, the
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Ron Kirk, U.S. Trade Representative, speaking at a press
conference following the conclusion of the 7th WTO
Ministerial Conference in Geneva, Switzerland.
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Chinese side regrets the other rulings made by the Appellate Body. The Chi-
nese side further reiterated that after China joined the WTO, it earnestly
implemented the duties under the WTO agreement in the area of publica-
tions market access, and that the channels for foreign publications, films
and audiovisual products to enter the Chinese market are “fully open.” (28)
An official Xinhua press report further indicated that China had fully put
forth the point of view that cultural products are special, and had requested
the AB to “respect the true meaning of members’ services commitments
( zunzhong chengyuan youguan fuwu chengnuo de zhenshi hanyi尊重成员
有关服务承诺的真实含义 ).” (29) The special nature of cultural products is
considered to be the fact that they combine commercial value and cultural
value, and therefore should not be treated as general goods. Lastly, the re-
port cited Beijing WTO Affairs Office deputy director Zhong Qing as stating
that there was doubt about whether publications retail should be considered
as goods or services, which would have consequences for China’s treatment
of foreign importers. (30)
Evaluating the official discourse
WTO cases can act as platforms for posturing for all parties involved in the
dispute, both to domestic and international audiences. They can be used to
show the national citizenry that their government stands up for the nation,
interest groups that the incumbents serve their interests and foreign parties
that the world trade game is taken seriously. Analyzing this discourse enables
us to take a closer look at how China and the US consider the WTO as an in-
stitution and each other’s position in the international trading system. I will
in particular look at three aspects of the discourse: the perception of the WTO
rules and procedures, the interests that both governments claim to defend
and the assumptions that seem to underpin the posturing between both sides.
From the US point of view, the objective of the WTO is to create and sus-
tain a rules-based trading system, which would benefit the United States’
economy as well as those of other trading partners. This commitment is
taken seriously in government (31) as well as in industry. (32) The discourse
that is used in both areas emphasizes fairness and the benefits that obeying
the rules bring to the United States. This implies that the United States vol-
untarily abdicates from a power-based negotiation model, in which its rel-
ative power would be much stronger than in a rules-based system. (33) In
the two cases, the United States are also clear that they are defending the
US copyright industry, and in the audio-visual media industries in particular.
They argue that Chinese measures, that violate the letter and spirit of the
WTO agreements, damage legitimate interests of the industry, in particular
due to losses related to piracy. At no point does the US claim that the mar-
ket barriers themselves may be causes for losses to US enterprises. At the
same time, by indicating the importance of the Sino-US relationship, the
US also isolates this issue from other policy considerations.
The Chinese discourse, on the other hand, seems to characterize the WTO
as a political, rather than legal body. First, it much less emphasizes the legal
aspects of the American claims. By invoking the “consensus” on dealing with
trade disputes, China seems to negate the United States’ right to start WTO
proceedings that all WTO members enjoy. Also, China seems to argue that
the Chinese efforts to protect IPR should have been sufficient to warrant
the US not bringing a case, regardless of any legal argument. Second, China
seems to imply in its comments that the proceedings would damage
broader Sino-US relationships. This may contravene the spirit of Article 3(10)
of Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which stipulates that com-
plaints and counter-complaints in distinct matters should not be linked. (34)
Third, China seems stubborn in stating the Chinese version of the facts, even
after Panel or AB have found otherwise. In particular, the statement that
China has always implemented its WTO commitments, and import channels
for media products are “fully open” seems particularly problematic. While
China had by then learnt to be a better WTO litigator, (35) it hadn’t yet mas-
tered the required diplomatic language. Fourth, at no point does the official
discourse make clear what the reasons are for the market access barriers
and the denial of copyright, or which interests are being defended. Lastly, it
is interesting that China emphasizes its right to censor publications, even
though this had not come under issue in either of the cases.
In short, the United States and China seem to be arguing different points,
highlighting their respective declared priorities and ideas. The next question
then became implementation and policy change on the Chinese side, par-
ticularly for DS363. In this respect, it is useful to find out whether and how
this issue was addressed in the Chinese media. It is sometimes assumed
that Chinese media function solely as a mouthpiece of the Party-State, in-
doctrinating the passive Chinese citizen with its own political message. Cer-
tainly, the Party-State has made it an objective to maintain a dominant
position in the Chinese public debate and build popular support for its rule
through mechanisms that Anne-Marie Brady refers to as “popular authori-
tarianism.” (36) The questions here, however are rather more complex, as
there are different interests that must be balanced. At the international level,
China has made WTO compliance a priority, but the outcomes of DS363
directly concern highly sensitive political issues. Economically, there may
be interests in China on different sides of the divide: cinema owners, for ex-
ample, would benefit from increased importation of foreign films, and the
same might be true for film distributors (37) or television channels. On the
other hand, Chinese content producers would likely be gravely harmed. (38)
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The press discourse after the cases
As a relatively simple case, in which China didn’t lose the most important
issue, there was little newspaper analysis of DS362 after the case’s conclu-
sion. This was slightly different with DS363, as a number of articles appeared
around the publication of the Panel and AB reports evaluating the potential
impact of the cases on the Chinese media sector. However, these articles
were limited in scope: they concentrated mainly on the film sector, and
some of them contained a number of factual mistakes, which influence the
perception of the outcome of the cases.
Factual mistakes
One salient characteristic of a number of both Chinese and Western news-
paper articles in these cases is the lack of factual understanding of both the
content and implications of WTO rules and obligations. Some of these con-
cern the relationship between import quota and moral concerns. China Daily
writes, for example, “China imports 20 foreign films a year for theatrical re-
lease. The ruling, however, does not force China to let in products it thinks
are harmful to public morals, which means the 20-film quota stays.” (39) Both
premises are true, but the conclusion does not follow from them. The quota
is there to control the aggregate impact of foreign films on China’s econ-
omy, and is a Chinese commitment in its GATS schedule. China’s right to
censor refers to its ability to control individual works in the market. Con-
ceivably, there are more than 20 films produced worldwide every year that
would meet censorship requirements, but many of these do not enter Chi-
nese cinemas due to quota restrictions.
A broader mistake is that the DS363 verdict somehow seems to imply
that the film quota violates WTO norms and should be abolished. This is
present in articles both on the Western side (40) and on the Chinese side. (41)
While there are many good reasons to get rid of the quota, this case is not
one of them, given that – as mentioned earlier – they are part of the corpus
of Chinese WTO commitments. Any change to them would require an up-
date of the WTO accession agreement. Apart from the question whether
this is legally possible or not, it would seem logical that this would be part
of a broader renegotiation of the Chinese terms of membership, which may
be politically nearly impossible in the present economic climate. Another
article mentions a Chinese promise to phase out film import quota by 2011.
This promise is not present in the Chinese Services Schedule (42) that lays
down the quota, nor is it present in the Sino-US agreement that paved the
way for Chinese accession. (43) Nonetheless, even through the reports about
these quotas are wrong, they may reflect the expectations of policymakers
and the industry, and influence further film policies. It may also be a tactic
to prepare actors on all sides for an easing of the quota, which might take
pressure of other areas where the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) did find
incompliance. Lastly, the People’s Daily writes that finding of incompliance
would mean that China would have to accept retaliatory tariffs. (44) While
this may be true, it omits the possibility of compliance.
Opening up the film sector
By the time the Appellate Body made its decision in DS363, the Chinese
cinema film sector had been growing at a rapid pace, which realigned the
interests of different actors in the policy sphere. The number of cinemas has
grown rapidly, as plans aimed to stimulate construction and renovation of
cinemas nationwide are being progressively realized. This increase in screen
real estate also requires more content, which in turn seems to cause in-
creasing demands for films, including foreign films. At the time of the Panel
decision, a number of articles were published which advocated for a more
open media sector.
This position is reflected interestingly in the Nanfang Daily. This argued
that opening media channels would not be a problem for censorship au-
thorities, as they could simply expand to meet demand. Also, the paper
stated that more competition would be good for the Chinese media sector,
as it would push for better products. Assuaging potentially worried censors,
and panning the inertia of government, it argued that allowing private cap-
ital into the television drama sector had provided better-received main-
stream programmes than State actors had been. Finally, it asked the
question how big the danger would be from foreign programmes, taking
place far away from Chinese viewers, and containing imagery to which Chi-
nese audiences would not have been used. (45)
The Global Times, notably, published an English-language editorial (46) after
the Panel Report was published, in which it stated that foreign media en-
terprises could have a “fair share” of the Chinese entertainment market after
the WTO verdict, which further reminded China that “opening up is a must.”
Global Times castigated the Chinese media sector for not having engendered
sufficient competition, and that public demand was “poorly fed.” The Peo-
ple’s Daily surveyed a number of Chinese film enterprises, who were confi-
dent that they would be able to survive competition from Hollywood.
Nonetheless, these articles remain limited to the film sector and to increas-
ing import quantities of foreign products – exactly the measure that did
not come under question in the WTO cases.
On the other end of the scale, the People’s Daily (47) interviewed a
spokesperson from Phoenix Television, stating that the Panel Report should
not be interpreted as a US win, but rather as “generally favourable” (zongtis-
hang youli 总体上有利 ) to the US position. This was due to the fact that
the film quota would remain in place, and that the distribution situation
also would not change. Also, the People’s Daily indicated that any appeal
would have to be fought on issues of law, rather than fact. In another article
on the same day, the People’s Daily interviewed professor Zhu Wangkang
of the National University of Singapore, who said that more open markets
might not result in better results for foreign rights holders, as both their
products and means of distribution might be unsuited to the Chinese mar-
ket. (48) On the other hand, the People’s Daily also quoted the US-China
Chamber of Commerce’s statement that they hoped the US and China
would jointly march towards freer trade. (49)
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The news website Sohu did not expect that this verdict would effect a pro-
grammatic change in China’s programme of cultural structure reform, which
had been launched in 2004, and aimed to ensure that China’s cultural products
would have a stronger impact at home and abroad. (50) However, it was con-
cerned that the verdict might have an adverse impact on the development of
China’s domestic film sector, and cited director Liu Miaomiao, who urged China
to develop along a more realistic, low budget path, rather than confronting
Hollywood’s big budget megaproductions head-on. (51) This sentiment was
echoed in other media, who were concerned that China lacked the capacity,
the “Star System” and the structural setup to compete with Hollywood. (52)
After the case closed, however, media attention became subdued, and less
discussion was held in the Chinese press than in foreign newspapers. To a
certain extent, this is not strange. There are a few institutionalized interests
in China that could play the role of policy entrepreneurs (53) for foreign media
interests or media liberalization. Cinemas and film distributors, for example,
would benefit from a larger amount of – usually high-grossing – foreign
films on the market. The question, however, would be how the Chinese film
sector would deal with this, given that it is often characterized as being un-
derdeveloped, suffering from creative deficits, low income and growth op-
portunities, and badly hit by media piracy. A number of articles were
published that gauged this potential impact. The Nanfang Daily, for exam-
ple, ascribed the drive to attract more private investment into the film sec-
tor to WTO pressure. (54) It also analysed how this might lead to more
diversification in the film sector, amongst others the use of IMAX technol-
ogy. (55) The Global Times warned Chinese filmmakers to be more imagina-
tive. (56) One Apple fan site hoped that the verdict would mean that the
iTunes service would be launched in China. (57)
In the press, as well, the foreign film trade does not seem to be a priority.
In one article published the same week the AB decision was announced, ten
years of progress in the Chinese film sector were celebrated, without one
mention of the WTO case, the influence or competition from foreign films. (58)
Another article in the same feature discussing foreign competition does not
refer once to the potential increased competition after DS363. (59) Rather,
the month after the AB decision, the film Avatar, which had become the high-
est-grossing film in Chinese cinema history, was pulled from cinemas, al-
legedly to reduce competition for an upcoming biographic film of Confucius,
that had been heavily supported by the State (although the State Adminis-
tration of Radio, Film and Television [SARFT] officially denied this). (60)
The English language newspaper China Daily, however, did keep the dis-
cussion on its pages, by reporting on negotiations to lift the quota, (61) and
discussing the potential implications in a cautiously positive light. (62) Also,
it published interviews with Chinese filmmakers that were confident they
would be able to withstand the influx of Hollywood films, (63) and reported
on the increasing amount and success of co-productions. (64) The China Daily
had advocated earlier for a relaxation of the film market, interviewing two
academics arguing for opening. (65) Other news outlets, however, remained
sceptical about change in media governance. This was illustrated in a special
feature of Wangyi Entertainment, published around the implementation
deadline. Here, interviews with film sector professionals made clear that
the two State-appointed distributors, China Film Group and Huaxia, would
remain in control of the film market. The WTO did not require the right to
distribute to be opened to foreign enterprises, which also ensured Chinese
private enterprises would not gain it. (66)
Moreover, by the second half of 2011, the public discourse on the media
sector became increasingly politicized. The perceived weakness of the Chi-
nese cultural sector had already spurred the leadership into designing in-
creasingly grand development plans for cultural structure reform ( wenhua
tizhi gaige文化体制改革 ). Also, there had been greater movements towards
tighter control over different areas of society. Rights-defending lawyers and
activists have been cracked down upon, as fears have arisen that China is
abandoning its rule of law project. In April 2011, the well-known artist and
activist Ai Weiwei was arrested and kept in detention for nearly three
months.
In October 2011, the Central Committee issued a Decision (67) in which it
outlined the objectives and ideology for the entire cultural sphere. The core
issue in this project was the establishment of a “core Socialist value system”,
which would “arm the Party and the People.” Domestically, this meant that
the priority became to optimize the attractiveness of the Party’s message,
and to diversify and improve the means through which it is disseminated
As a result, more efforts would be poured into the construction of cultural
infrastructure and “excellent cultural products” ( wenhua jingpin文化精品 ).
This discourse contains a strong anti-internationalist discourse, at least on
the importing side. While one of the key components of the cultural Deci-
sion is to expand China’s international soft power and influence, (68) little
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emphasis is put on the receiving side, apart from cautioned and conditional
language concerning “mutually beneficial” cultural exchange and learning
from “the excellent cultural achievements of mankind.” The militant lan-
guage of the Decision was supplemented by a speech Hu Jintao gave to the
6th Plenum of the Central Committee, which was later published in the Party
policy magazine Qiushi. In this speech, Hu warned against the “long-term
strategy” of “foreign hostile powers” that aimed to “Westernize and divide
China.”
The consequences of this Decision on the media sector became clear very
soon, with the SARFT taking the lead. In a brief period of time, it issued a
number of regulations, amongst others reducing the number of entertain-
ment shows on satellite television channels, prohibiting advertising in tel-
evision dramas, and limiting the amount of television dramas broadcast on
provincial television channels. In an interview with the People’s Daily (69), a
SARFT spokesperson stated that these measures were taken to enhance au-
dience choice. In December, the State Council published a draft law (71) for
the promotion of the film sector. This law is aimed at lowering market ac-
cess barriers, enhancing financial input into the film sector, but also at
strengthening supervision and management. There are few provisions on
import of foreign films, and no indication of market liberalization In other
words, media sector reform in China at the moment is driven by central po-
litical considerations, in a direction of more control. Against this background,
it is difficult to see how media enterprises could openly advocate more
openness. Rather, it seems that the enterprises that are permitted to operate
– and hence, co-opted into the power structure, are more interested in
maintaining the status quo.
The 2012 Deal
In short, China’s implementation of the DS363 conclusions was very lim-
ited, and the powerful media administration was driving developments in
the cultural sphere towards stronger control and centralization, as well as
rejection of foreign influence. However, given the deepening economic crisis
and the need to engage China on other issues, and the difficulty of calcu-
lating appropriate values for retaliatory tariffs, (71) there seems to have been
a lack of political will in Washington to push strongly for a resolution.
Nonetheless, it seems that the Chinese side wished to settle the matter,
and in February 2012, a deal was struck between vice-Presidents Jo Biden
and Xi Jinping, who was on his first visit to the White House. (72) They agreed
that a new quotum of 14 “special films” would be instituted on top of the
20-per-year commitment in the Services Schedule, and would give prefer-
ence to films of which 3D and IMAX versions are available. Also, the portion
of revenue going to the film studio would be raised from 13 percent to 25
percent. (73)
This deal was met with considerable enthusiasm on the US side, Vice-Pres-
ident Joe Biden said it would “make it easier than ever before for US studios
and independent film-makers to reach the fast-growing Chinese audience.”
The deal would also save “thousands of American jobs in and around the
film industry,” and give Chinese audiences “access to more of the finest
films made anywhere in the world.” (74) MPAA Chairman Chris Dodd called
it a “major step forward in spurring the growth of US exports to China.” (75)
At the Chinese side, there was a higher sense of confidence concerning
the Chinese film industry’s ability to meet the challenge of more US com-
petition. In a feature on the agreement, the People’s Daily stated that the
relationship between the US and Chinese film industries was no longer one
of “wolves and sheep” (lang he yang狼和羊) (76). Rather, it argues that China
is has already made a small number of products that can compete with
Hollywood standards, and that this should push Chinese filmmakers to excel
more (77). Confirming this fact in a play on words, popular director Feng
Xiaogang stated he was not afraid of the “Hollywood Tiger” ( haolaihu 好莱
虎 ). (78) There were even some rumours about a third film import licence,
for which a number of interested companies were preparing an applica-
tion. (79)
From the trade point of view, however, this agreement is relatively disap-
pointing. At the time of writing, the text of the agreement had not yet been
published, but there might be questions concerning the position of this
agreement in the WTO framework. As a bilateral agreement providing extra
trade concessions, there might be a risk that the agreement would violate
the MFN principle, (80) unless the new quota are open to all foreign films.
Moreover, although the absolute number of important films will go up, there
are still rules concerning the proportion of screen time foreign movies are
permitted to occupy. These remain at one-third of total screen time, which
still limits the potential market for foreign films. Also, the agreement was
negotiated by Xi Jinping, and it is not clear to what extent SARFT or other
media administrations, who will have to implement this agreement, were
involved in this decision. This may have consequences for the way in which
the film administration will expand access to foreign films. Given that SARFT
had imposed further television broadcast limits for foreign television dramas
a few days before the agreement was concluded, (81) it does not seem that
the basic position vis-à-vis foreign entertainment products has changed.
Also, SARFT communicated to the People’s Daily that they had not yet been
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Special feature
informed about this decision the day after the agreement was made. (82)
Most importantly, this agreement does relatively little to address the un-
derlying issues. The Agreement does very little to move towards freer trade
for cultural products with China, and does not address the letter or the spirit
of WTO rules and the DS363 decisions. Hence, it remains to be seen how
long it will take until Hollywood will restart lobbying for more market access
in China, for example in the field of online media retail. Given the funda-
mental disagreement about the economic and trade nature of cultural prod-
ucts between the United States and China, this is perhaps the only deal that
could have been made. It seems to fit within the film administration’s efforts
to keep foreign content at bay, while attracting knowhow and technology
deemed necessary to develop the Chinese film sector. Another manifesta-
tion of this line is the proliferation of film co-productions, (83) exemplified
by an announcement that DreamWorks will open a joint venture animation
studio in Shanghai. (84)
Conclusion
This essay aimed to provide more insight in the reception of WTO disci-
pline in China in the field of cultural products and services. More specifically,
it first analyzed the official Chinese discourse on the two WTO cases China
– Intellectual Property Rights and China – Audiovisual, and compared it with
the US discourse. Second, it aimed to understand the reaction and evalua-
tion of the Chinese press, and contextualize it in the wider background of
cultural policy. Third, it outlined the resolution eventually reached by both
sides and the reaction thereto.
The official discourse shows that at least where these cases are con-
cerned, China and the United States are working at cross-purposes, reflect-
ing the basic divergence of their respective views of cultural products. The
United States emphasize the rules-based nature of the WTO, the way in
which they claim the Chinese measures at issue conflict with WTO disci-
pline, as well as the limited nature of these cases in the whole of Sino-US
relations. China, on the other hand, stressed the non-legal aspects of the
dispute: the efforts that were made to conform to WTO requirements and
the impact of the cases on the wider bilateral relationship, and the impor-
tance of censorship, even though China’s right to censor never came under
issue. Also, China flatly denied the factual basis for the findings of the Panel
and the Appellate Body in China – Audio-visual, even after these had pub-
lished their reports. While official discourse should not be accepted at face
value, this divergence nonetheless shows that China, at least in these cases,
has not been very apt in using the language and style of the international
trading system. Given the politically sensitive context in which it operates,
the WTO dispute settlement body has consistently taken a textualist and
legalist line in applying WTO law. (85) From the Chinese discourse, however,
it seems that China considers the WTO to be a political institution rather
than a legal one.
In the Chinese media, the cases weren’t subjected to much attention out-
side of factual reporting. The few articles that appeared evaluated the im-
pact of the cases on the media sector, tapping into the developing narrative
of cultural structure reform, commercial development and international
soft power that has become increasingly prioritized in recent years. With
the exception of the People’s Daily, most newspaper outlets are moderately
positive about the prospects of the Chinese media market after liberaliza-
tion, especially after the announcement of the 2012 deal. In particular,
they emphasize Chinese filmmakers’ capacity to better respond to the de-
mands of Chinese audiences and the beneficial role of more competition.
Arguments concerning free trade are not made.
During recent years, the shifting political climate has steered cultural pol-
icy into another direction, and it is quite clear that opening the door to for-
eign cultural imports, or expanding upon the minimal commitments in the
Services Schedule, is not a priority. What does this tell us about Chinese
participation in the WTO? On the one hand, considerable care should be
taken to expand findings about one specific (and politically very sensitive)
to the whole range of WTO-related issues, especially given the high priority
China seems to have given to WTO compliance in other sectors. On the
other hand, it does help to highlight the Chinese expectations about the
role of the WTO and Chinese commitments and the limits thereof. The Chi-
nese discourse, both official and in the press, shows that the leadership has
seen WTO accession as an instrumental move to maintain economic
growth, legitimacy and authority. As a correlation of that, it is not willing
to open up the cultural sector to the extent demanded by the United States,
and has avoided to fully implement the findings from China – Audio-visual.
This is in itself not strange. WTO Members have been in incompliance with
WTO discipline earlier, concerning copyright, (86) hormone beef (87) and gam-
bling services, (88) amongst others, for domestic political reasons. A long as
the member is willing to face potential retaliatory action, this is the end of
the legal line as far as the WTO is concerned.
It does open interesting questions as to non-trade concerns in interna-
tional trade law, which may be subject of research in law, but also political
science. In China, we are faced with the problem that many of these issues
are still very opaque, and that primary knowledge is lacking. Hence, detailed
case studies about the relationships between domestic policymaking, in-
terest groups, governance and international pressure are necessary to better
understand the structures and processes driving Chinese behaviour. Also,
and perhaps even more interesting, would be to place these Chinese issues
in a comparative context, and analyse where and how Chinese practice re-
sembles or diverges from practices in other nations, regions, cultures and
political systems.
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